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WARRANTIES OF KIND AND QUALITY UNDER THE UNIFORM
REVISED SALES ACT
Caveat emptor, as an instrument for allocating loss, was well adapted to a
business era when equally knowledgeable parties dealt in homely chattels at
arm's length.1 Solution of today's problems of consumer protection and alloca-
tion of loss involves, however, a reappraisal of contemporary social and eco-
nomic fact.2  In view of the modem consumer's inequality of technical
knowledge, his inability to test highly processed goods except by use, and
his dependent bargaining position in a spiderweb distribution system, un-
mitigated caveat emptor becomes mercantile absurdity.
The long struggle of enlightened courts to readjust the balance in favor
of the unprotected consumer is only now reaching fruition. The dramatic
evolution of warranty law from its humble origins in tort and the action on
the case for deceit, has been characterized and, indeed, made possible by its
increasing assimilation of contract principles 3 As tort concepts of fault and
negligence have been further abandoned, seller's obligation to deliver goods of
the "warranted" kind and quality has tended to become absolute,4 and it has
become possible'to experiment with techniques for adequate consumer pro-
tection and the imposition of losses upon those best able to prevent and to
absorb them.5
The Uniform Sales Act of 1906,6 codifying the better case law of the
nineteenth century, is conceded to have advanced warranty law by the in-
1. The doctrine of caveat emptor represented reaction against stringent regulation
of quality standards by guild and state in pre-laissez-faire times. See, Hamilton, The
Ancient Maxim Caveat Einptor, 40 YALE L. J. 1133 (1931).
2. LLEvImLYN, CASES AND MATEnIALS ON THE LAw oF SALEs 204 (1930).
3. 1 WLirSON, SAI .s § 197 (2d ed. 1924) ; ProssER, HANDwo0, op THE LAW OF
ToRTs 705 (1941).
4. PRossza, op. cit. supra note 3, at 669-70.
5. That these are the relevant social objectives is generally agreed by writers in the
warranty field. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, op. cit. stpra note 2, at 341; VoLD, HAnmoO or THE
LAW OF SALES 466-7, 474 (1931) ; Notes: 37 COL. L. Rxv. 77 (1937) ; 42 HAnv. L Rrx.
414, 417-8 (1929) ; 33 CoL L. REv. 868, 869 (1933) ; 18 CoRx. L. Q. 128, 133 (1932) ; 7
WAs H. L. REv. 351, 358 (1932) ; 31 MIcH. L. Rnv. 264, 265 (1932). But analyses in terms
of "fault' still occur. See Russell, Manufacturer's Liability to Ultimate Consumcrs, 21
Ky. L. R v. 388 (1933); Waite, Retail Liability and Judicial Louunahing, 34 Mxrcir. L.
Rnv. 494, 514, 520 (1936).
6. Adopted to date in 37 jurisdictions, including Alaska and the District of Colum-
bia. 1 UmFoR LAws ANNOTATED, SALES, Cum. Supp. 6 (1948). The Uniform Sales
Act (referred to hereafter as USA) has been described as "'codification' in the tradi-
tional Anglo-American manner, a mere collection of the current concepts as gleaned from
the latest expressions of judicial opinion, grouped and arranged Ath proper respect for
tradition and history." Morrow, Warranty of Quality: A Comparative Survey I, 14
Tu A x L. REv. 327, 338 (1940).
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fusion of much contract doctrine.7 But in certain material respects, consumer
protection was retarded by the Act s and no legal technique was provided for
allocating losses among the disparate parties in a complex modem distribution
system. The proposed Uniform Revised Sales Act9 enters the warranty scene
with needed revisions and creative additions' ° designed to clear the path to
solution of both problems."
THE RmvlsoRY SECTIONS
The basic principles and policies of the old Act have been carried over for
the most part intact into the three revisory sections of the URSA, sections 37,
38 and 39, -but a general elimination of conceptual confusion and consumer
"booby-traps" has taken place. Seller's obligations stand more sharply and
fully defined, and the theoretical basis of these basic obligations is clarified and
systematized.
Express Warranties: By Affirmation, Promise, Description, Sample
Although it was of small consequence, since identical legal incidents were
attached to both, the old Act preserved a strange conceptual distinction be-
tween express and implied warranties.12 Express warranties were confined to
affirmations of fact or promises made in relation to the goods ;13 warranties
arising from seller's descriptive language14 or use of samples 15 were called
"implied." From the standpoint of buyer's reasonable expectation, no reason
7. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society I, 36 COL. L. REv. 699, 714
(1936).
8. For critique of the deficiencies of the USA in the matter of warranties, see Mor-
row, Warranty of Quality: A Comparative Survey II, 14 TULANE L. R.v. 529, 562 et seq.
(1940) ; Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society II, 37 CoL L. REv. 341, 379-93
(1937).
9. AmERiCAN LAW INSTITUTE AND NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS, THE CODE OF COMMERCIAL LAw Art. II (UNIFORM REVISED SALES AcT, 1948)
(hereinafter cited as the URSA).
10. The "revisory" sections include §§ 37, 38, and 39; the "new" sections are § 40,
41, 42, 119, 120, 121, and 122. The division is for ease of discussion only and is necessarily
somewhat arbitrary as innovations appear in the revisory sections and vestiges of the
Uniform Sales Act appear in the so-called "new" sections. Tangential sections, such as
§§ 21, 22, 23 and 26, bear importantly on the warranty sections, but their applicability is
not confined to warranty.
11. But solution via warranty is necessarily limited to the deterrent effects of civil
liability. The financially irresponsible "fly-by-night," to whom civil liability is at best a
remote consideration, will be controlled successfully only by penal sanctions. Thus the
full realization of adequate consumer protection will also require extension of legislative
policing of quality standards in the nature of Pure Food and Drugs Acts and meat in-
spection laws.
12. Morrow, supra note 6, at 340-3.
13. USA § 12.
14. USA § 14.
15. USA § 16.
[Vol. 57: 13891390
WARRANTIES OF KIND AND QUALITY
for the distinction is apparent, for in all three cases seller is actually expressing
facts to buyer.' 6
A more valid conceptual distinction is that express warranties are those
which arise from the language or actions of the parties, whereas implied
warranties are those which the law imports into the bargain without reference
either to their language or actions.' 7 Such is the dichotomy adopted by the
URSA, and accordingly the express warranty section has been expanded to
include both sales by description and by sample.' 8
The new Act supplies a simple and direct theoretical approach to express
warranties. The drive is to give effect to the consensual agreement between
the parties. Thus for the language or conduct of the parties to result in an ex-
press warranty, it must appear to the trier-of-fact from all the surrounding
circumstances that the parties bargained with reference to that particular sam-
ple, affirmation or description-made it "a part (or basis) of the bargain." 19
Though buyer now may rely upon seller's express undertaling, he is not to
benefit by an inadvertant slip of seller's tongue-by an affirmation of fact or
descriptive word which, though made during the "dicker," actually does not
constitute part of the parties' understanding. To cite an unlikely example, if
the facts show that buyer knew the table was made of oak, seller's mistaken
description of it as mahogany is hardly to be considered a "part of the bargain"
and an express warranty.
Important elements in the factual setting to be considered in determining
whether an express warranty exists are usage of trade, course of dealing and
course of performance-factors which underlie every section in the new Act.2°
Thus a statement made by one merchant to another merchant may be shown
in the light of trade usage to have been merely a statement of opinion and so
not binding,' while the same statement made to an unitiated retail consumer
might well become an express warranty.
16. Morrow, .spra note 6, at 341, 343. WnxisTox, op. d. upra note 3, § 249. Older
cases, antedating the USA, called both descriptive language and sales by sample express
warranties. Bogert, Express Warranties in SaIcs of Goods, 33 YAM. L. J. 14, 21 n. 51
(1923).
17. VoL , op. cit. supra note 5, at 441. Cf. Prosser, Thc Implied Warranty of
Merchantable Quality, 27 MiNN. L. Rxv. 117, 122-5 (1943).
18. URSA §37(1) (b) (c).
19. URSA § 37. The Draftsmen's Comments on § 37 describe express warranties as
resting on the "dickered aspects" of the bargain.
20. URSA §§21 and 22. "Agreement," as defined in §9(2) of the URSA, "means
the bargain in fact as found in the language of the parties or in course of dealing or usage
of trade or course of performance or by implication from other circumstances." For
definitions of "course of dealing" and "usage of trade" see particularly URSA §§21 (1),
(2). When course of dealing or usage of trade are inconsistent with express terms, the
latter prevail. URSA § 21(4) (b).
21. The URSA carries over from § 12 of the USA specific exclusion of seller's
statements of opinion or commendation of his goods, statements which under the old Act
would not have induced reliance by an ordinary reasonable buyer and under the new
19481 1391
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But resolution of conceptual confusion is only a secondary objective of
this reshuffling of warranties, for the real significance of the change, as is
true of all other changes in the "revisory" sections, lies in the increment of
consumer protection thereby attained. Under the URSA, once the seller has
assumed obligations of express warranty, he may not free himself therefrom;
on the other hand, the new Act largely preserves seller's privilege to modify
implied warranties.2 With different legal incidents attached to express and
implied warranties, confusion could no longer be tolerated as to what war-
ranties are express and as to the theoretical basis for so distinguishing them.
As buyer protection is furthered by expanding the scope and effect of the
express warranty category, so, also, his burden is lightened by deletion of the
vestigial tort elements found in the express warranty section of the old Act,
No longer need he prove that the seller's affirmation or promise was inducive
to buyer's reliance and that in fact he did rely. Though buyer usually was not
forced to prove reliance under the old Act, the thoroughly objective approach
of the URSA eliminates this potential stumbling block, and remedies another
former conceptual inadequacy.-
Nor will court and buyer be forced under the URSA to use artificial argu-
ments to find additional consideration to support a warranty made subsequent
to the passage of title but still essentially part of the agreement.24 Vexatious
questions as to the exact moment at which the warranty was made or as to
whether buyer relied on the warranty at the exact moment of title passage
Act would not be from an objective viewpoint a basis of the bargain. "Puffing" state-
ments or "dealer's talk" are the clearest examples, such as, "good," "high class," "valu-
able." See VOLD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 447. For collection of representative cases of
"opinion" statements see Bogert, supra note 16, at 33-4. Under the USA where buyer
knows that his actual information is equal or superior to seller's his reliance on seller's
statements is not justified, and such statements are mere "opinions." VOLD, supra at 4,16-7.
Such circumstances under the URSA will operate similarly to show that seller's state-
ments are not an essential "part of the bargair."
22. URSA § 40(1). For discussion of the concept of "iron sections," see Llewellyn,
supra note 8, at 384-7, wherein is presented a technical argument that even under the
USA the "implied" warranty in sale by description was an "iron" section both in sense
and in law. For detailed discussion on disclaimer of warranties, see note 62 hnfra and text
pp. 1400-04 infra.
23. Morrow, supra note 8, at 564-5. Thus, despite the fact that the USA purported
to be a "codification of contract, not of tort," included were the requirements of induce-
ment and reliance which were part of warranty when it was a 16th century action in tort
for deceit. Ibid.
24. See, e.g., Bowen v. Zaccanti, 203 Mo. App. 208, 208 S.W. 277 (1919) (statement
made by seller after contract, but before buyer had paid full price, and which induiced
buyer to pay, is a warranty) ; International Harvester Co. v. Haueisen, 66 Ind. App. 355
118 N.E. 320 (1918) (additional consideration found in payment of price before due) ;
Barton Bros. v. Chicago Fire Proof Covering Co., 113 Mo. App. 462, 87 S.W. 599 (1905)
(warranty made subsequent to sale in compliance with understanding reached at time of
contract relates back to date of contract and is supported by the consideration of the
main contract). Cases collected, WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 3, §211; Bogert, supra
note 16, at 17, 18.
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become merged in the single inquiry of whether the warranty is "a part of the
bargain."
Still another step is taken to secure to buyer the full fruits of seller's em-
press undertaking, by a modification of the flat statement in the old Act that no
affirmations of value are to be considered warranties.2 The draftsmen's com-
ments set forth a remedial distinction between seller's affirmations as to the
"value" and other warranties. Thus buyer is given an action for rescission or
actual damages suffered if the goods are not of the "warranted" value, but
he is not allowed the benefit of the unique warranty measure of damages
which would give him the difference between the "warranted" and actual value
of the goods.- This seems a valid compromise, for, though it is reasonable
that seller should not normally be made an insurer of buyer's profit on resale,
there seems to be no good reason otherwise to differentiate between affirma-
tions of value and other affirmations of fact which become "part of the bar-
gain."
Implied Warranty of Fitness for Particular Purpose
Whereas under the URSA express warranties represent the bargained
aspects of the sale, implied warranties enter the bargain as rebuttable pre-
sumptions to which the law will hold seller until a contrary understanding
is clearly shown. The theory is simply that all sellers dealing in a given
factual situation should be held to assume the obligations which good faith
sellers normally assume under those circumstances. Under the new Act, as
in the past, consumer protection will depend to a large degree upon judicial
conception of what obligations are normally assumed by good faith sellers.
Among the more important implied warranties, the warranty of fitness for
25. In declaring that affirmations of value were not warranties, § 12 of the USA vas
out of accord with the common law rule that statements regarding value of the goods
sold might be warranties and that it was for the trier of facts to determine whether the
buyer justifiably relied on the statement as one of fact. Bogert, supra note 16, at 32
26. Thus the URSA approves a holding like that in Foote v. Vilson, 104 Kan. 191,
178 P. 430 (1919) (seller's statement that goods would invoice from $9,000 to $11,000
were for purposes of rescinding the sale an obligatory statement of fact where the goods
later inventoried at $2,500; but the statement would not be binding if the buyer sued to
recover lost profit, i.e., the difference between the warranted and the actual value of the
of the goods.) The Comments on the URSA extend this dualistic treatment to all opinion
or commendatory statements. In a case like Detroit Vapor Stove Co. v. J. C. Nrecter
Lumber Co., 61 Utah 503, 215 P. 995 (1923), where seller's declaration that stoves would
"sell like hot cakes" was held merely an opinion, the URSA for purposes of rescission
would- treat this statement as an express warranty that the goods would sell and as an
opinion only where buyer sues for lost profit.
27. The Draftsmen's Comments on URSA § 37 explain that implied warranties rest
so clearly upon a common factual situation or set of conditions that no particular language
or action is necessary to evidence them. That the URSA injects a strong measure of
public policy into the "common factual situation," however, is apparent from the high
standards of merchantable quality established in sales by merchants. See, notes 45, 46,
and 47 infra and text thereto.
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a particular purpose, carried over largely intact into the TJRSA,28 rests on
the buyer's justifiable reliance on seller's skill and judgment to select goods
suitable for some special purpose which buyer has made known either ex-
pressly or by implication 9 Since a buyer who picks out his own goods or
orders a specific article obviously does not rely on seller's judgment, a well-
established common law exception developed where a "known, described and
definite" article was purchased. 0
The Uniform Sales Act codified this exception under the unfortunate
terminology "patent or other'trade name."' Though courts generally have
attributed the common law meaning to this phraseology,32 confusion as to the
logical basis for the exception has led to a widespread tendency to apply it
mechanically without the essential inquiry as to whether in fact buyer is
relying on seller's judgment despite use of a patent or trade name in the
course of sale.33 Thus where a purchaser orders "XX pipe,"84 further stipu-
lating that it must be "tough", or a seller sells "XX pipe" knowing that buyer
is relying on him for "tough" pipe, the mere fact that a trade name is used
should not automatically deprive purchaser of the warranty of fitness for his
particular purpose.85 True, the trade name or definite description may be so
28. URSA §39. This warranty is found in § 15(1) of the USA. It is to be noted
that while under the old Act it was incumbent on buyer to make known his particular
purpose expressly or impliedly to seller, the URSA provides that the warranty arises
where seller has "reason to know" of buyer's purpose. This alteration coincides with the
more liberal case law interpretation. Compagnia Italiana Transporto Olii Minerali v.
Sun Oil Co., 43 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1930) (seller must know buyer is relying on seller's
judgment or facts must charge seller with knowledge).
29. WiLLisroN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 235.
30. VouL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 462-4. For illustrative cases, see, BOGERT, CAsES ot
THe LAw oF SALEs 487-93 (2d ed. 1947).
31. USA § 15(4). For general discussion of sale by "patent or trade name," see,
Note, 80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 281 (1931). Compare Snelling v. Dine, 270 Mass. 501, 170
N.E. 403 (1930) with Hughes v. National Equipment Corp., 216 Iowa 1000, 250 N.W.
154 (1933) ("mere fact" that the article had a trade name did not exclude the obligation
for fitness).
32. Llewellyn, supra note 8, at 364. Thus the "languaging confusion" has turned out
to be an unessential accident either through the inertia of the courts or the influence of
the draftsman's book. WiL.isToN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 236a.
33. Llewellyn, supra note 8, at 362 et seq. See, e.g., Century Electric Co. v. Detroit
Copper and Brass Rolling Mills, 264 Fed. 49 (8th Cir. 1920); and see references in
Lr.EwELYN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 334-5. Mechem, Implied Warranties in the Sale of
Goods by Trade Name, 11 MiNN. L. REv. 485 (1927).
34. The example is developed from the early case of Dounce v. Dow, 64 N.Y. 411
(1876) (iron) in which the patent or trade name exception was applied. See Llewellyn,
supra note 8, at 362.
35. A sharp controversy has arisen frequently where buyer makes his special purpose
known to seller, who thereupon recommends goods identified by a patent or trade name.
Many courts have held that where buyer buys under such circumstances there is no war-
ranty of fitness for particular purpose. See cases collected in VoLD, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 462-3 n. 71 (cases contra, id. n. 72).
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used as to negative buyer's reliance, but both courts and text writers have
failed to see that there may be no inconsistency between the two lines of de-
scription, "XX pipe and tough," and that in such a case in order to safeguard
the purchaser both lines of description should cumulate against seller. 0
The URSA's omission of the "patent or other trade name" exception
should remove a hitherto serious source of confusion and a treacherous pitfall
for buyer. Judicial inquiry will be forced back into proper focus. Use of a pat-
ent or trade name or request for a "known, described and definite" article will
be only evidentiary facts to be considered along with other circumstances in
determining whether buyer actually relied on seller's judgment.
Implied Warranty of Merchantability
The most potent weapon given the consumer under both the old and new
Acts is the implied warranty of merchantability: the implication of the law that
all goods sold by a merchant are warranted fit for the purposes which such
goods ordinarily serve.37 In contradistinction to the implied warranty of fitness
for particular purpose, reliance by buyer has never been part of merchant-
ability, for it has always been purely a matter of contract-a question of what
the good faith merchant-seller normally undertakes to deliver s
Many courts under the Uniform Sales Act have manifested a predilection
to forsake the broad warranty of merchantability for the narrower warranty
of fitness for particular purpose,3 9 and there has been a confused tendency,
especially in regard to packaged goods, to inject the alien requirement of
buyer reliance.4 In part this confusion may have arisen from the grouping
36. Llewellyn, supra note 8, at 363. See, also, Brown, Inplied Warrantics of Quality
in Sales of Articles under Patent or Trade Names, 2 NVis. L. Rnv. 335 (1924) ; Mechem,
supra note 33. The apparent severity of the patent or trade name provision has resulted
in reluctance on the part of the courts to find that a transaction is governed by the sec-
tion. Note, 10 CoRe. L. Q. 521, 522-3 (1925).
37. USA § 15(2); URSA § 38. For complete discussion of merchantability, see,
Prosser, Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MIN.m. L. Rn-v. 117 (1943).
38. At least since the famous case of Jones v. Just, L.R. 3 Q.B. 197, 9 B. & S. 141
(1868), in which the whole matter of merchantability was summed up and stated in terms
which substantially shaped § 15(2) of the USA. The fundamental principle of merchant-
ability had been stated as early as 1815, however, in Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144, 171
Eng. Rep. 46 ("The purchaser cannot be supposed to buy goods to lay them on a dung-
hill.")
39. Prosser, supra note 37, at 134-5.
40. Stemming from an early confusion of the warranty of merchantability with the
warranty of fitness for particular purpose, the latter requiring reliance on seller's skill and
judgment. Thus, since buyer must know his retailer had no such kmowledge of the goods
as did the manufacturer, he could not have relied on the retailer. Even after passage of
the USA, which specifically applied the warranty to all dealers, some few jurisdictions
refused to hold the retailer liable, especially in regard to sales of food in sealed con-
tainers. For argument in support of this minority position, see Waite, supra note 5. The
overvhelming majority of the courts now hold that the dealer warrants his goods to be
saleable and fit for ordinary use, even when they are sold in sealed containers. Prosser,
supra note 37, at 150, 151 n. 195.
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together of the implied warranties of fitness for particular purpose and
merchantability as companion subsections in the old Act. Despite such handi-
caps, it had become the "warranty of quality presumptively to be implied in
every sale of goods made by a dealer." 41 The new Act separates the two
implied warranties, making each an individual section, and not only greatly
elaborates merchantability but places it in a position of accentuated importance.
These changes, together with the requirement that a merchant must clearly
warn his buyer if he wishes to escape the obligation to provide merchantable
goods, 42 should forestall any latent judicial reluctance to recognize merchant-
ability as the basic instrument of consumer protection.
The most significant change, however, is the addition of a definition of "mer-
chantability." The blank check which the old Act drew upon the future by
leaving the meaning of merchantability completely open has been filled in by
judicial hand.4 3 The more advanced developments are codified in the new Act.
The resulting definition recognizes that merchantability involves both use
(consumption) and exchange (resale) aspects within its general scope of
fitness for the ordinary purpose.44 Emphasis upon resaleability in the URSA
is seen in requirements that goods must "pass without objection in the trade
under the contract description,"'4" be of "medium or fair average quality," 40
within trade tolerances of kind, quality and quantity, and be adequately
packaged and labelled.47 These are minimal standards which the courts are free
to revise upwards as the economic scene changes. 48 Other aspects of mer-
41. Prosser, supra note 37, at 117, 167-8.
42. URSA § 40(2).
43. One of the most serious deficiencies of the USA was its failure to define what
"merchantability" meant. Llewellyn, supra note 8, at 383. For collection of cases illustrat-
ing the varied approach of the courts in regard to the meaning of "merchantability," see,
BOGERT, op. cit. .rupra note 30, at 506-7 n. 26.
44. Prosser, s=pra note 37, at 131-2.
45. URSA § 38(2) (a). Thus in Jones v. Just, L.R. 3 Q.B. 197, 9 B. & S. 141 (1868),
the fact that the Manila hemp wetted by sea water was in fact resold at auction as
"Manila hemp with all faults" at about 75 per cent of the original price, did not prevent
the goods from being unmerchantable. Accord, Niblett v. Confectioners' Materials Co.,
3 K.B. 387 (1921) (resold with brand removed).
46. URSA § 38(2) (b). The URSA indorses such a case as Howard v. Hocy, 23
Wend. 350, 351, 352 (N.Y. 1840) ("at least of medium quality or goodness . . . such as
would bring the average price at least.")
47. URSA §§ 38(2) (d), (e), and (f). Prosser, supra note 37, at 129.
48. Thus the introductory phrase in § 38(2) of the URSA says, "Goods to be mer-
chantable must at least be such as . . ." The Draftsmen's Comments on URSA § 38 point
to such further attributes of merchantability as fitness of the goods to withstand shipment
where the goods are to be shipped by the seller or are bought for reshipment. Philip
Olim & Co. v. C. A. Watson & Sons, 204 Ala. 179, 85 So. 460 (1920) (apples shipped to
buyer for resale must be in condition to keep them sound and saleable for a reasonable
time). And in sale of blooded animals where attestation of breeding is one material ele-
ment of their value, appropriate documents must accompany the animals to satisfy the
requirements of merchantability. Weeks v. Lee, 42 S.D. 355, 175 N.W. 355 (1919) (re-
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chantability are brought out in the warranty of title section, under which
seller impliedly warrants freedom in the domestic market from patent in-
fringement, statutory violations and title complications.19
Though consistent with the consumer-minded approach of the new Act and
the not unreasonable assumption that a buyer in dealing with a merchant nor-
mally expects to receive medium-grade goods, objection may be taken to the
"medium or fair average" standard of merchantable quality. In a market where
goods of a certain description vary considerably in quality, the new medium-
grade requirement will mean that a greatly increased number of sellers will
be guilty of breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, despite the
fact that their goods are both readily saleable and usable. Though buyer should
not be forced to accept goods that are unfit for the market or for use, it is
questionable whether he should be the beneficiary of an implied warranty
which assures him not only passable but medium-grade goods. ° It would not
seem to be an undue burden on him to contract for any desired grade above
"passable"-the standard generally approved by the casesY' Moreover, the
main purpose of consumer protection is assured by fitness for use. "Medium
or fair average quality" appertains principally to fitness for resale. Although
it may be argued that the small retailer often needs implied warranty protec-
tion almost as much as the consumer, the great majority of purchasers for
resale are professionals, who need at most a modicum of protection.5- Thus
covery allowed, measured by decrease in value of cows because of missing registration
papers where established practice was to furnish such papers).
49. URSA § 36. It is to be noted that these aspects of merchantability do not apply
to foreign markets. Buyer must expressly contract for such protection or look to the
implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose. Sumner, Permain & Co. v. Vebb &
Co., 1 K.B. 55 (1922) (marketable in London where sold, prohibited by statute in Argen-
tina where destined for resale; held to be of merchantable quality) ; Wilford Hall Labora-
tories v. Shoenfeld, 182 App. Div. 504, 169 N.Y.Supp. 912 (1st Dep't 1918) (buyer must
make purpose of sale in foreign country known and receive seller's express %warranty) ;
Bencoe Exporting and Importing Co. v. Erie City Iron Works, 280 Fed. 690 (2d Cir.
1922) (boiler plates "for export" must be exportable).
50. "The 'fair average' quality recommended by the... Revised Uniform Sales Act
seems to set too lofty a standard, if 'fair average' is construed, as it might conceivably
be, to mean the average of all the goods that are made or sold." Prosser, supra note 37,
at 138. See Judge Learned Hand in McNeil & Higgins Co. v. Czarnikow-Rienda Co,
274 Fed. 397, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (merchantability "means a good enough delivery to
pass generally under that description after full examination. 'Medium quality or good-
ness' . .. seems to me perhaps too high a standard."). The Draftsmen's Comments on
URSA § 38 interpret "medium" as synonymous with "fair average."
51. The "medium quality" adopted in the early case of Howard v. Hoey, 23 NVend.
350 (N.Y. 1840) has been rejected. See, e.g., McNeil & Higgins Co. v. Czarnikow-Rienda
Co., 274 Fed. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); Baer & Co. v. Mobile Cooperage & Box Mfg. Co,
159 Ala. 491, 49 So. 92 (1909) ; Kenney v. Grogan, 17 Cal. App. 527, 120 Pac. 433 (1911)
(not warranted as good as average) ; Inter-State Grocer Co. v. Geo. IV. Bentley Co., 214
Mass. 227, 101 N.E. 147 (1913) ; Gallagher v. Waring, 9 Wend. 20 (N.Y. 1833).
52. See Isaacs, The Industrial Purchaser and the Sales Act, 34 Cot. L. REv. 262.
264-5 (1934).
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the medium quality required by the new Act would seem to give excessive pro-
tection where least needed.
Particularly does this criticism seem justified by the fact that the same
remedies on breach of warranty are made available indiscriminately to all
purchasers, whether for consumption or for resale, whether professional or
amateur. 3 When the excessive protection given the professional purchaser by
the medium quality requirement is coupled with the extension to him of all
the remedies available to the unprotected consumer, it would seem that the
professional buyer's hand has been unduly strengthened. It is arguable that
the purchaser for resale would be adequately protected if assured merely a
passable grade of goods and only the right to rescind the sale if the goods
are non-conforming, save where he is sued himself for consequential damages
by an injured consumer. As it is, however, the URSA's undifferentiated ap-
proach to remedies for the professional purchaser accentuates the doubtful
advisability of the blanket requirement of medium quality.
As the meaning of merchantability has been codified, its scope has been
expanded, in the interest of consumer protection and in accordance with the
better case law, to include food merchants."4 Specific inclusion of restaurant
keepers ends a quaint anti-consumer notion derived from "innkeeper days"
that food served in a restaurant is not the subject of a sale contract at all, but
merely of a "service" and is thus not a source of warranty obligations on the
part of the restaurant dealer. The real question, as the new Act recognizes,
is not "sale" or "no sale," but rather what the good faith restaurant keeper
53. Though remedies on breach of warranty are beyond the scope of this comment, it
may be noted that valuable steps have been taken in the URSA to protect the buyer by
expanding the remedies available to him. Thus, the barbarous doctrine of "election" of
remedies written into USA § 69 (2) has been eliminated, and buyer is in all cases under
the URSA assured his action for consequential damages. URSA §§ 112-116. In addition
he is given the right to "cover" by purchasing substitute goods and to recover from
seller the difference between the cost of cover and the contract price together with inci-
dental or consequential damages, but less any expense saved in consequence of seller's
breach. URSA § 113. Under URSA § 77, on the other hand, seller is given valuable pro-
tection against surprise rejection by buyer for minor defects. Thus, "where buyer rejects
a non-conforming tender which seller had reason to believe would be acceptable with or
without money allowance the seller may if he gives seasonable notice have further reason-
able time to substitute a conforming tender," and where the contract time of delivery has
not expired, seller may give seasonable notice of his intention to cure and make con-
forming delivery within the contract time. For a complete discussion of remedies, see
Comment, Remedies For Total Breach of Contract, p. 1360 supra.
54. URSA §38(1).
55. VOLD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 477-9. Liability depended on wilful fault or negli-
gence. Nisky v. Childs Co., 103 N.J. Law 464, 135 Atl. 805 (1927) ; 50 A.L.R. 227. See
Notes, 20 MiNN. L. Rxv. 527 (1936) ; 10 So. CAL. L. REv. 188 (1937). Cushing v. Rod-
man, 65 App. D.C. 258, 82 F. 2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (reviews the authorities and applies
implied warranty of merchantability where restaurant dealer sells roll with pebble im-
bedded which caused customer injury).
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normally undertakes to deliver: clearly, food fit for consumption. '0
The reference to service of food in restaurants is intended to indicate in-
directly that any sort of sale of food by a merchant, whether in sealed con-
tainer or otherwise, is within the warranty of merchantability. Thus will be
deterred a short-sighted judicial penchant for confining the retail food dealer's
liability to fitness for buyer's particular purpose.57 This misconception has led
frequently to denial of recovery to the consumer on the grounds that he could
not reasonably have relied on the retailer's knowledge of the fitness of the
food.58 Indeed, there has been a general tendency in warranty literature to
treat food and drink as a separate categoryYd° The new Act should serve to
reintegrate food and drink as merely one "peculiarly poignant" aspect of the
general consumer problem.GO
Though the warranty of merchantability, unlike the warranty of fitness for
particular purpose, does not apply to a casual non-merchant seller because he
is not expected to stand behind his goods as would a professional, the new
Act soundly extends the scope of merchantability to include sales by a non-
merchant where a general guarantee is proclaimed.01
56. A clear majority of the courts now find a sale and apply the warranties of the
USA. See Prosser, supra note 37, at 152 n. 201.
57. The argument between Prof. Waite and Prof. Brown deals at length with the
precedent and policy questions involved in holding the retail food dealer liable. Waite,
supra note 5; Brown, The Liability of Retail Dealers for Defectirv Food Products, 23
MixN. L. Rv. 585 (1939); Waite, Retail Responsibility-A Reply, 23 Mnur. L REv.
612 (1939).
58. The number of courts denying the retailer's liability for the fitness for use of his
goods is rapidly declining. For examples of cases denying liability even under the USA,
see, e.g., Kirldand v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 233 Ala. 404, 171 So. 735 (1936) ; Pelletier
v. Dupont, 124 Mie. 269, 128 Adt. 186 (1925) ; Harrington v. Montgomery Drug Co., 111
P.2d 808 (Mont. 1941); Merriman v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 17 Tena. App. 433, 68
SAV. 2d 149 (1934). The overwhelming majority of the cases now hold the retailer
liable, even where the goods are sold in sealed containers and all the more so when they
are open to his e-xmmination. For collected cases, see Prosser, supra note 37, at 150 n.195,
151 n.196.
59. Llewellyn, supra note 8, at 404-8.
60. Llewellyn, stpra note 7, at 704 n. 14.
61. "The use of the word 'warrant' without reference to any particular qualities, is
equivalent to an assertion of general soundness. Sometimes the word 'guaranty' is used
in the sense of 'warranty'... ." Bogert, supra note 16, at 17. The URSA in applying the
warranty of merchantability to a "seller [who] is a merchant with respect to such goods"
departs from the terminology of the USA where merchantability was implied if "the goods
are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description (whether
he be the grower or manufacturer or not)." The change is not significant in view of the
liberal interpretation generally given the phrase "by description" under the USA. See,
e.g., Brandenberg v. Samuel Stores, 211 Iowa 1321, 235 NAV. 741 (1931) ("an A-No. 1
fur coat") ; Inter-State Grocer Co. v. George W. Bentley Co., 214 Mass. 7-7, 101 N.F_.
147 (1913) (order for "500 cases Y oil sardines and 200 cases of -. mustard sardines") ;
Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 38, 175 N.E. 105 (1931) ("Ward's
Bread"). URSA § 7(1) defines "merchant" as a "person who by his occupation holds
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THE "NEw" SECTIONS
Remedial revision of the warranty sections of the old Act, however, is of
only limited efficacy in augmenting consumer protection. And as a means of
making possible the proper allocation of the burden of consumer's injury, mere
revision of the USA is completely inadequate. To move further on both
fronts the "new" warranty sections of the URSA lay fresh foundations of
doctrine and policy.
Contractual Modification of Warranties and Remedies: the Disclaimer Prob-
lem
Nowhere has the need for doctrinal improvement become more apparent than
in the matter of disclaimer clauses used to limit seller's warranty liabilities and
to curtail buyer's remedies.0 2 The origins of the disclaimer problem are
plainly discernible. Warranty being a matter of contract, the parties have
been free, at least on the doctrinal level, to contract away warranty obligations
as they please, 3 and sellers have used their superior bargaining position to
extricate themselves from their growing burden of warranty obligations."
The disorganized and dependent consumer has had little alternative but to
acquiesce, in this one-sided legal disarmament.
Typical of seller's effort is the omnipresent standard manufacturer's
warranty clause :00 warranting against defective materials and workmanship
(but not design), for a short period of time, usually 90 days, and providing
a limited form of remedy on breach of warranty, e.g., repair or replacement of
the defective part on condition that buyer return the part at his expense and
abide by seller's decision as to whether or not the part is defective.00 Equally
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in
the transaction. ...
62. For general discussion of the disclaimer problem, see Notes, 31 COL. L. REv. 1325
(1931) ; 23 MINN. L. REV. 784 (1939) ; 1939 Wis. L. REV. 459.
63. The rule is that a sale may be with or without warranty. BENJAMIN, SALES 708
(2d ed. 1920) ; Buliucic, SALES 119 (3d ed. 1913) ; 1 WILLISTON, Op. Cit. supra note 3,
§ 239a; Prosser, supra note 37, at 157-8. USA § 71 expressly sanctions the right of the
parties to waive warranties.
64. Note, 23 MINN. L. Rv. 784-5 (1939).
65. Bogert and Fink, Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods,
25 ILL. L. REv. 400, 409 et seq. (1931).
66. An extreme case would be: A buys an automobile under standard warranty, and
within 3 months of delivery, an axle breaks under normal driving and A is killed; his
representative may be limited to return of the broken axle to the factory at his own
expense and the obtaining of a new axle. There can be no recovery for the destruction of
the remainder of the car or A's death-though the defective axle was the proximate cause
of both, and the warranty of sound materials and workmanship has been breached. Despite
the fact that such a non-warranty clause was held void as "repugnant to every concep-
tion of justice" as far back as 1920 in Mills v. Maxwell Motor Sales Corp., 105 Neb.
465, 181 N.W. 152 (1920), a clause purporting to limit buyer's remedy in exactly the
same way is at present being used by General Motors Corp.-perhaps for psychological
rather than legal effect.
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common is the general disclaimer of "all warranties express or implied save
those expressly provided for herein."
The courts, sensitive to the position of buyers, have tended to construe
disclaimer clauses strictly against seller, 7 and by ingenious legal devices have
often succeeded in vitiating their effect.0 8 Only rarely, however, have they
refused to pay lip service to a theory which permits the parties to contract away
all liability whatsoever.69 The result has been a contest of wits between drafts-
men and courts with the need for concerted statutory control becoming in-
creasingly apparent.70
The new Act fulfills that need. Recognizing that non-warranty clauses or
clauses limiting or substituting remedies are not in all circumstances unde-
sirable and that a large measure of freedom of contract should be reserved to
the parties, the new Act takes the approach that if the parties in good faith,
without coercion or surprise agree to exclude implied warranties, they may do
so. Such exclusion, however, must be in specific terms, and any ambiguity vill
be resolved against seller.1 The familiar general language of disclaimer may
no longer be used successfully.7 2 An understanding between the parties to
67. See VoLD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 468-70; Prosser, mpra note 37, at 164; Note,
23 Mi N. L. Riv. 784, 785 (1939).
68. Upon the theory that implied warranties are imposed by law and not by agree-
ment, certain courts will allow recovery on breach of the warranty implied, despite a provi-
sion purporting to limit seller's obligations to the warranties expressly stated. Be kevold
v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 NAV. 790 (1927) (clause providing that "no warranties have
been made" except those noted thereon, but recovery allowed on implied warranty of fit-
ness for buyer's purpose), and exclusion of warranties has been construed to mean only
express warranties. Hardy v. G.M.A.C., 38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E. 327 (1928), noted in
42 HARv. L. REv. 710 (1929), 27 MIcH. L. R-v. 592 (1929); and statement in a contract
that it contains the entire agreement does not exclude implied warranties. Hughes v.
National Equipment Corp., 216 Iowa 1000, 250 NAV. 154 (1933).
69. Note, 23 MiNN. L. REv. 784, 796 (1939). One lower New York court has de-
clared that disclaimer clauses will not be tolerated in retail sale of food because they are
against "natural justice and good morals" where the public health is involved. Linn v.
Radio Center Delicatessen, 169 Misc. Rep. 879, 9 N.Y.S. 2d 110 (N.Y. City Cts. 1939);
cf. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Frey, 127 La. 183, 53 So. 486 (1910) (exclusion of
warranties regarding latent defects in machinery would be contra bonos nores).
70. Bogert and Fink, stpra note 65, at 413; VoLD, op. cit. mspra note 5, at 470-1. A
few states have passed statutes in an attempt to protect both buyer and seller with respect
to dealings in certain commodities. See, .g., OI.A. STAT. § 8875 (seeds) (1931) ; No.r
CARoLINA CoDE § 4690 (fertilizer) (1931) ; but only North Dakota has expressly limited
the waiver of any of the implied warranties provided for in the USA. Norrm DAKOTA
Comp. LAws §§ 5991a, 5993a (Supp. 1925).
71. URSA §40(2). Just how specific the disclaimer of implied warranties need be
under the URSA the Draftsmen's Comments do not say. A strict construction of "spe-
cific," however, might well force seller to enumerate the various listed aspects of mer-
chantability found in § 38(2). The impact of the new Act upon disclaimer drafting of
course will be profound, but in all likelihood considerable inertia will appear because of
the fact that disclaimer clauses are drafted with an eye towards creating the desired
psychological effect upon the layman ignorant of the law.
72. For illustrative cases collected, see BoEnm, op. cit. mpra note 30, at 553 n. 74.
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remove all implied warranties from their agreement will be inferred where
they use language such as "with all faults" or "as they stand."78 And where
buyer examines the goods during the bargain or, upon demand by seller, re-
fuses to examine, there are no implied warranties as to patent defects which in
the circumstances should have been revealed by. examination.74
But more important is the provision that the implied warranties may be
circumstantially negatived or modified by "course of dealing or course of
performance or usage of trade.""h Though these three factors are made a part
of every sale when consistent with the express agreement of the parties,70
their repetition here is important as a matter of emphasis, for it is by reference
to them that the new Act in large measure achieves the flexibility that particu-
larly characterizes its warranty provisions. The URSA aims at creating a
level of protection sufficient for the uninformed consumer. From the point
of view of giving protection where protection is needed, however, it is ob-
vious that technically expert industrial purchasers 7 or, for that matter, the
ordinary consumer who buys at a sheriff's sale, auction, or from a junk
dealer should not benefit from the high level of protection given the inexpert
consumer in usual transactions through the implication of warranties. By relat-
ing these warranties to trade usage and course of dealing or performance the
new Act makes allowances for such aberrational types of buyers and moulds
seller's obligations appropriately. Thus in those special areas of our economy
where caveat emptor is still functionally sound and implicit in the situation, the
implied warranties need not, and presumably will not be raised.
While reserving a large degree of control to the parties in altering implied
warranties, the new Act makes all disclaimers of express warranties inopera-
tive.78 In so doing it pursues a logical progression dictated by definition, for
if express warranties are "a part (or basis) of the agreement between the
parties," a stipulation in the same agreement negativing their existence is
73. URSA § 40(2) (a). Hitherto, the courts have not hesitated to construe such
language as a complete disclaimer of all warranties. See, e.g., Rogers v. Hale, 205 Iowa
557, 218 N.W. 264 (1928) (sale of second-band taxicabs); Union Trust Co. v. Detroit
River Transit Co., 162 Mich. 670, 127 N.W. 780 (1910); Alexander v. Sola, 185 N.Y.
Supp. 869 (Sup. Ct. 1921) ; Industrial Rayon Corp. v. Clifton Mills, 310 Pa. 322, 165 Atl.
385 (1933) (sale of inferior yarn).
74. URSA § 40(2) (b). For discussion of the effect of inspection upon implied war-
ranties, see, Prosser, supra note 37, at 153-7.
75. URSA § 40(2) (c).
76. See note 20 supra. The USA provided in § 71 that implied warranties might be
negatived by "course of dealing between the parties, or by custom, if the custom be such
as to bind both the parties to the contract or the sale." But the old Act was gravely
deficient in that it failed to define custom or course of dealing or to provide for the man-
ner in which these factors were to be proved. The URSA rectifies the deficiency in §§ 21
and 22. Particularly important is the provision, designed to prevent surprise, for advance
notice to the other party where evidence of trade usage is to be introduced. Id. at § 21 (6).
77. Isaacs, supra note 52. The author cogently criticizes the USA for its undifferen-
tiated approach to sales to lay consumers and to manufacturing purchasers.
78. URSA § 40(1).
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fundamentally inconsistent. Though this logic would have been equally valid
under the old Act, the expression of it in the URSA alters the almost univer-
sally recognized doctrine that all warranties both e.-press and implied may be
disclaimed.
7 9
A further aspect of the disclaimer problem, the contractual deprivation of
buyer's remedies, is covered in the new Act. Buyer is to have a definite baseline
of remedy at all events, for the URSA provides that if the "circumstances
cause the exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose" the
regular remedies provided in the Act may be had.s0
Moreover, the URSA, taking the forthright position that those who would
sell must do so in good faith and conscience, explicitly imposes the obligation
of good faith in every salesI and empowers the court to refuse to enforce an
unconscionable contract or clause and to substitute "such provision as would
be implied .. . if the stricken clause had never e.xisted." s2 For seller this
means that he must leave buyer a remedy which will insure him the "sub-
stantial value of the contract."83 Consequential damages may be limited only
so far as seems conscionable," and liquidated damages must be reasonable
in the "light of anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties
of proof of loss, and the convenience .. .of otherwise obtaining an adequate
remedy." 5 However, within these limits the parties are left wide discretion in
arranging additional or substituted remedies appropriate to their particular
situation.30
Thus the potent threat to the consumer created by seller's ruthless abuse of
79. See note 63 supra. Though under the URSA express warranties are not subject
to negation by usage of trade or course of dealing or performance, these factors %%ill bear
powerfully in determining whether an express warranty exists in the first place. See
note 20 supra and text thereto.
80. URSA § 122(2). The "essential purpose' of remedies under § 122 of the URSA
must be read in the light of § 102 which provides that remedies under the Act are to be
liberally construed to the end that the "aggrieved party may be put in as good a position
as if the other party had fully performed."
81. § 26(2) of the URSA provides: "Every contract within this Act imposes an ob-
ligation of good faith in its performance and one between merchants shall also be inter-
preted in accordance with commercial standards." "Good faith" is defined in URSA § 10.
82. URSA §23(1).
83. URSA § 122(2). In addition § 122 provides that when the exclusive or limited
remedy deprives buyer of the "use or disposition for which the seller at the time of con-
tracting had reason to know the goods were intended, remedy may be had as provided in
this Act." This appears to be surplusage, for surely the phrase "substantial value of the
contract" is broad enough to include use of the goods. Indeed, the value of the contract
is the use of the goods either in consumption or resale.
84. URSA §122(3).
85. URSA § 121(1). Likewise a "'deposit' or 'down' or part payment of more than
20 per cent of the price or $500, whichever is the smaller, to be forfeited on breach, is
so forfeited only to the extent that it is a reasonable liquidation of damages:' Id. at
§ 121 (2).
86. URSA § 122(1) (a).
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contract doctrine is brought to a two-fold impasse. Disclaimer clauses, effec-
tive henceforth only in regard to implied warranties, must strike the court as
fair and reasonable, and buyer at all events is to have adequate remedy. Free-
dom of contract has been necessarily and creatively limited in the public
interest.
Protection of Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties and the Sub-vendec
The generally beneficial importation of contractuaf concepts into the law of
warranty has unfortunately introduced the awkward doctrine of "privity"-a
notion which has operated frequently as a cordon sanitaire between seller and
injured consumer. Thus members of buyer's family, his guests, licensees or
business invitees, lacking direct contractual relations with seller have been
denied warranty protection. 7 Furthermore the sub-vendee has been forced to
sue his immediate vendor,88 and imposition of liability upon the offending
party often depended upon a wasteful and cumbersome chain of actions
rendered fragile by the possibility of insolvency of any intermediate vendor.80
Doctrine has it that by the mere act of resale a middle-man does not manifest
an intention to pass his warranty action against his supplier along to the con-
sumer. Further, since warranty, like an insurance contract, is said to be a
contract of personal indemnity, it has been urged that the purchaser by gift
or resale should not be allowed to enlarge the scope of his indemnitor's li-
ability. 0
Privity has forced courts to listen to tortuous agency arguments 1 and has
87. Privity of contract traditionally has been the sne qua non of a contract action for
breach of warranty whether express or implied. Notes, 18 CORN. L. Q. 445, 451 (1933),
14 TULANE L. REv. 470 (1940). See, e.g., Smith v. Salem Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 92
N.H. 97, 25 A2d 125 (1942). For extensive collection of cases, see, Bogert, op. cit. supra
note 30, at 556 n. 75. In recent years there has been an increasing trend to expand war-
ranty liability in favor of subpurchasers and other remote parties injured through defects
in the goods. VoLD, op. cit. stpra note 5, at 474-5.
88. Feezer, Manufacturer's Liability for Injuries Caused by His Products: Delcetive
Automobiles, 37 MicH. L. Ray. 1, 1-4 (1938). WILUSTOX, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 244.
Note, 42 HARV. L. Ray. 414, 417-8 (1928).
89. In Kasler & Cohen v. Slavouski, [1928] 1 K.B. 78, B. bought dyed rabbit skins
from A., made fur collars therefrom, and resold to C.; C. resold to D., and D. to E., a
draper. E. then sold a coat with one of the fur collars attached to F., a customer, for
her own wear. F. developed "fur dermatitis," owing to antimony in the fur, and sued E.
for damages for breach of warranty. E. gave notice of the action to D., D. to C., C. to
B., and B. to A. E. defended and judgment was given against him for 671 and 2481 costs.
E. claimed this sum together with his own costs, amounting to 6431 in all, from D. D.
recovered this amount from C. together with a further sum for his costs. C. claimed from
B., and B. having paid 6541 and 451 for costs, sued A. for 6991 damages for breach of
warranty. B. recovered for the damages originally paid to F., the costs of both sides in
that action, and for the costs incurred by themselves and C. and D.
90. WILLIsmON, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 244.
91. See, e.g., Wadleigh v. Howson, 88 N.H. 365, 189 Atl. 865 (1937) (warranty of
wholesomeness ran to husband because wife acted as his agent in purchasing pork pie
which was contaminated).
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led to circumventive rationalizations: e.g., the warranty runs with the goods
like a running covenant ;92 or, more realistically, actual contractual relation-
ship is found between seller and remote parties by virtue of seller's advertising
representations and the injured party's action-in-reliance thereon.a The
courts have been most willing to forsake the requirement of privity in regard
to potentially dangerous products, 4 and the public policy, always at least im-
plicit in such cases, has increasingly become the explicit basis of decision.
The new Act knifes through the substantative barricade of privity and
extends warranties to those whose "relationship to him [buyer] is such as to
make it reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected
by the goods. . . ...9 Nor may seller lessen his warranty obligations to such
remote parties except by lessening them to his immediate vendee ;0 and even
this expedient may be condemned by the court if buyer is deprived of an ade-
quate remedy. It is apparent that the URSA removes the privity requirement
only as regards the consumer for use and not as regards the purchaser for re-
sale. The latter may sue the original manufacturer or party ultimately re-
sponsible only where his immediate vendor has resold under a warranty similar
to that extended by the original vendor. 7 Of course, where a purchaser for
resale is injured in person by defective goods, he would then be a consumer
for use to that extent and would be given recourse against the original vendor
regardless of privity of contract or the extension by his immediate vendor of
a similar warranty.
92. See, e.g., Anderson v. Tyler, 223 Iowa 1033, 274 N.NV. 48 (1937) ; Davis v. Van
Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 800, 176 N.W. 382, 392 (1920). VoLD, op. dr. .siPra
note 5 at 475.
93. See, e.g., Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 28 N. 309
(1939) ; Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P2d 409 (1932) ; Notes, IS Corn.
L. Q. 445 (1933) ; 14 TULAxE L. Rnv. 470, 471 (1940).
94. Note and cases collected, 142 A.L.R. 1490 (1943). Note, 33 COL L. RE%. 86, 871
et seq. (1933).
95. URSA § 42.
96. Ibid.
97. URSA § 42 provides: "A warranty whether express or implied extends to any
natural person who is in the family or household of the buyer or who is his guest or one
whose relationship to him is such as to make it reasonable to expect that such person
may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in persm by brcacli of
the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section." (Italics
added.) URSA § 120 gives a subvendee a direct action against any person subject to
impleader under URSA § 119, and the latter section provides: "(1) Where a buyer re-
sells and is sued for any breach with regard to which he would have an action over against
his seller" he may implead his seller. Thus, where no personal injury is involved, and
a remote third party seeks to hold the original seller liable for breach of a warranty of
resaleability, he must show that his immediate vendor resold to him under a warranty
similar to that extended by the original seller. A provision in the original sale contract
that no warranty of resaleability was extended to subvendees should suffice to protect the
original seller in such an instance, whereas, a provision negativing fitness for use or
consumption, of course, would be ineffective.
1948] 1405
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Having extended warranty protection to remote parties, the new Act pro-
vides procedural machinery whereby larger social objectives may be attained:
the expeditious imposition of loss upon the link in the production and distribu-
tion chain which is best able to pay, to spread the burden via price and insur-
ance, and to police quality standards; and the safeguarding of the links which
are both innocent and unable to bear the shock of litigation.98 Depending on
the pattern of distribution, the dominant and responsive link may be manu-
facturer, wholesaler or retailer.99
The need for a cumbersome chain of actions has been eliminated and the re-
mote party may sue his warrantor directly without first seeking satisfaction
from his immediate vendor. 00 In the normal course of events the financially
weak retailer, to whom litigation may be ruinous and from whom small satis-
faction may be expected, will be by-passed. When he is subjected to suit, the
URSA gives him the protection of modem impleader machinery, enabling him
to vouch-in his seller in any instance where he is sued on a warranty similar
to that undertaken by his seller. 10 ' Short of express immunization, which may
be objectionable on constitutional grounds,10 2 the weak link is thus protected as
fully as possible. Where, however, the remote seller cannot be reached, the
burden must fall upon the retailer who, in all likelihood, is better able to bear
the loss, than the consumer.'03
Cumulation and Conflict of Warranties
A distinct gain in consumer protection is achieved with the provision in
the URSA for a simple means of resolving conflicting warranties.10 4 The old
Act offered no rational solution for this problem. The "patent or other trade
name" exception, alluded to above, led to mutually exclusive treatment of
warranties that in many instances should have been considered consistent and
cumulative.10 Paradoxically, warranties by description and sample were made
automatically cumulative when in actuality they might be completely incon-
sistent.10 6 The only contribution made by the old Act in this regard was the
abolition of the primitive doctrine that express warranties automatically pre-
clude all others'
07
The URSA, indorsing the policy that express and implied warranties
98. Llewellyn, supra note 7, at 704 n. 14; LLEWELLYN, op. cit. srupra note 2, at 341.
99. Note, The Marketing Structure and Judicial Protection of the Consumer, 37 COL.
L. REv. 77 (1937).
100. URSA § 120.
101. URSA § 119. The URSA adopts by reference the impleader procedure which
"is or may be provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
102. Llewellyn, spra note 7, at 704 n. 14; Llewellyn, supra note 8, at 407.
103. Note, The Marketing Structure and Judicial Protection of the Consumer, 37 COL.
L. REv. 77, 84-5 (1937).
104. URSA § 41.
105. See supra note 31 and text thereto.
106. USA § 14.
107. USA § 15(6).
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wherever possible shall cumulate against seller, provides that in cases of con-
flict the intention of the parties is to determine which warranty is dominant.
To aid in ascertaining intention, technical specifications displace conflicting
samples or descriptive language, and samples from an existing bulk in turn
displace general descriptive language. Express warranties exclude inconsistent
implied warranties with the exception of the implied warranty of fitness for
particular purpose.I°s The latter exception is well founded. If the intention
of the parties is to govern conflicts, this particular warranty, the only one in
which intent (i.e. buyer reliance) is a shw qua non, naturally should displace
all others.
CoNcLusION
The early transition from tort to contract freed the warranty from the
trammels of negligence and reasonable care and has enabled courts to mould
warranty principles to conform to the changing needs of the economic com-
munity. The inevitable result of this transition, however, has been to bring
warranty up against certain contract concepts which have inhibited and re-
tarded its development-notably privity and the contract principles which have
nurtured the disclaimer problem. One function of the new Act is to free
warranty from these conceptual deterrents. Privity is dead. Freedom of con-
tract is whittled down when brought face to face with public interest.
But more important is the spirit of the new Act. Good faith commercial
dealing is the criterion, and those who would sell must measure up to it. High
standards have been established from which departure may be made only
within the bounds of conscionableness and subject always to judicial concep-
tions of fairness. These high standards are not rigid, however, for the princi-
ples of warranty now incorporate trade usage, course of dealing and perform-
ance and the particular circumstantial setting of the transaction. Thus,
although the Act is pointed towards the waif of our business society, the con-
sumer, it is designed to give judicial latitude in withholding protection from
professional buyers when the full protection of the Act appears unjustified.
Even that dour gentleman caveat emptor finds his proper place within the
ambit of the Act. It is this very flexibility, the emphasis upon trade norms,
good faith commercial standards, and conscionable dealing, which appears
most promising in the Act.
But the job is only begun in the writing of the Act. The legal tools have
been sharpened and the doctrinal path cleared. In the last analysis, protection
of the consumer and proper allocation of the burden of his injury will, as in
the past, depend upon the case-to-case wisdom of the courts.
10. URSA § 41 (a) b) (c).
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